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Abstract Recent papers in the economic literature empha-
sise that the use of temporary contracts (TE) could have
a detrimental effect on productivity. However, there are dif-
ferent reasons to believe that the impact of TE might not be
homogeneous across sectors. In this article, we study the
impact of TE on productivity growth and, in particular, we
wonder if it differs according to sectors’ skill intensity. Our
data set is an industry-level panel of European countries that
allows to divide sectors according to the skill intensity. Our
main result is that TE has a negative impact on productivity
growth, but it is more damaging in skilled sectors. While
an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of TE in
skilled sectors would decrease labour productivity growth
of about 1–1.5%, in unskilled sectors the decrease would
be of 0.5–0.8%. This result is robust to different skill in-
tensity indexes and productivity measures, as well as to the
sample composition. We also discuss policy implications of
this result for labour market regulation.
Keywords Productivity · Temporary employment · Skill
intensity · Differential effect
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Auswirkungen befristeter Beschäftigung auf die
Produktivität
Die Bedeutung der Qualifikationsintensität von Branchen
Zusammenfassung Jüngste wirtschaftswissenschaftliche
Abhandlungen betonen, dass die Nutzung befristeter Ar-
beitsverträge einen negativen Einfluss auf die Produktivi-
tät haben könnte. Es sprechen jedoch verschiedene Grün-
de dafür, dass die Auswirkungen befristeter Arbeitsverträ-
ge nicht in allen Branchen gleich sind. In diesem Artikel
untersuchen wir den Einfluss von befristeten Arbeitsverträ-
gen auf das Produktivitätswachstum und fragen insbeson-
dere, ob es je nach der Qualifikationsintensität der Bran-
chen Unterschiede gibt. Unser Datensatz ist ein Panel eu-
ropäischer Länder auf Wirtschaftszweigebene, das es uns
gestattet, die Branchen nach Qualifikationsintensität zu un-
terscheiden. Unser wichtigstes Ergebnis ist, dass befristete
Beschäftigung einen negativen Einfluss auf das Produktivi-
tätswachstum hat, dies aber in Branchen mit hoher Qualifi-
kationsintensität stärkere negative Auswirkungen hat. Wäh-
rend ein Anstieg des Anteils an befristeter Beschäftigung
in qualifikationsintensiven Branchen um 10 Prozentpunkte
das Produktivitätswachstum um rund 1–1,5 % senken wür-
de, betrüge dieser Wert in weniger qualifikationsintensiven
Branchen nur rund 0,5–0,8 %. Dieses Ergebnis ist stabil
für verschiedene Intensitätsindices und Produktivitätsmaß-
nahmen sowie für die Stichprobenzusammensetzung. Des
Weiteren behandeln wir politische Auswirkungen dieses Er-
gebnisses für die Arbeitsmarktregulierung.
1 Introduction
Following the widespread diffusion of temporary employ-
ment (TE) in European countries, a large concern has been
K
D. Lisi, M. A. Malo
growing about direct and side negative effects of increasing
flexibility of labour markets. The recent flexibility reforms
had been introduced with the aim of removing labour mar-
ket rigidities, which in the supply-side thinking (see e. g.,
OECD 1999, 2003; IMF 2007) were seen as the main cause
of stagnant labour markets, under the implicit assumption
that more flexible conditions for workers would not affect
innovative capacity and productivity growth (Vergeer and
Kleinknecht 2014). In this regard, however, most recent pa-
pers studying the role of TE in different European countries,
and employing different empirical approach, find a negative
and significant impact of TE on innovation and productiv-
ity (Ortega and Marchante 2010; Cappellari et al. 2012;
Lisi 2013; Kleinknecht et al. 2014). Furthermore, the re-
cent macro stylized-facts and, principally, the growthless
job creation condition have drawn even more attention on
the impact of flexibility reforms on productivity (Boeri and
Garibaldi 2007; OECD 2007).
The main objective of this paper consists in studying
the impact of the share of TE on productivity, explicitly
considering the differential effect in skilled and unskilled
economic sectors. From this perspective, we go beyond to
the current literature arguing that there are good reasons
to suspect that the impact of TE could differ significantly
according to sectors’ skill intensity. For this purpose, we
build an industry-level panel of European countries that
allows to divide sectors according to the skill intensity.
This research connects with the wide spreading concern
about cost-saving flexibility reforms in general and, in par-
ticular, temporary contracts. In fact, the debate both in the
literature and in public institutions has been moving from
promoting all types of flexibilization of labour markets to
fight ‘Euroesclerosis’ (OECD 1994), toward criticizing TE
as a form of flexibility at the margin (Boeri and Garibaldi
2009), especially because temporary contracts are found to
damage the career prospects for young people (Cazes and
Tonin 2010; OECD 2015), decrease the provision of on-
the-job training by firms (Albert et al. 2005, 2010), reduce
workers’ earnings (Booth et al. 2002; Garz 2013) and, as
a side effect, negatively affect aggregate labour productivity
(Kleinknecht 1998; Vergeer and Kleinknecht 2011, 2014).
In this perspective, it seems highly relevant to study the
role of sectors’ skill intensity behind the impact of TE, as
the different channels of transmission through which TE
affects productivity, which we discuss below, could have
a different role according to skills’ intensity by industry.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that
attempts to investigate the impact of TE differentiated ac-
cording to sectors’ skill intensity. Our main result is that
TE is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a neg-
ative effect significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors,
and this would seem robust to little changes in the skill in-
tensity index and in the sample used, as well as to different
productivity measures. In particular, an increase of 10 per-
centage points of the share of TE in skilled sectors would
lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour productivity
growth, whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be
of 0.5–0.8%. To some extent, this result might support the
idea that TE is currently used more as a cheaper form of
job, instead of as a least-cost way of screening new workers
(Booth et al. 2002; Güell and Petrongolo 2007; Autor and
Housman 2010; Garz 2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. Sect. 2 provides the back-
ground for the empirical analysis, with the previous litera-
ture on TE, flexibilization and productivity. In Sect. 3 we
present the empirical analysis, focusing on the strategy to
disentangle the impact of TE across sectors. Then, Sect. 4
describes the characteristics of our dataset and main vari-
ables. In Sect. 5 we present our estimates and provide dif-
ferent robustness checks. Finally, Sect. 6 collects the main
conclusions of this study.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical arguments
The labour market reforms of the last decades have been
introduced with the objective of relaxing the rigidities and,
thus, making labour markets more flexible. In particular,
European flexibility reforms concentrated in the so-called
“numerical” (external) flexibility that allows firms to adjust
their workforce by flexible firing and hiring, and “wage”
flexibility concerning the wage-setting institutions (Boeri
and Garibaldi 2009; Vergeer and Kleinknecht 2014).1 As
a result, this process of flexibilization has led to labour
markets increasingly characterized by lower employment
protection (EPL) for regular workers and larger use of
atypical contracts for hiring new workers (Lucidi and
Kleinknecht 2010; Walwei 2014; Eichhorst and Tobsch
2015; ILO 2016).2
The theoretical support for flexibilization policies, com-
ing especially from the supply-side thinking (OECD 2003;
IMF 2007), was usually grounded under the implicit as-
sumption that more flexible labour markets would not af-
1 In our study, we focus more on the effect of “numerical” flexibility
on productivity growth, to emphasize the role of sectors’ skill inten-
sity. For a recent study concerning the effect of weak wage growth on
productivity, see Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2014).
2 In principle, one might expect that temporary workers would receive
a risk premium above the normal wage, for the higher risk of becom-
ing unemployed. In practice, however, temporary workers appear to
earn less on average respect to regular workers, as showed by large lit-
erature (Booth et al. 2002; McGinnity and Mertens 2004). Therefore,
as emphasized by Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2014), labour market re-
forms concerning “numerical” and “wage” flexibility seem to work in
the same direction of lowering the firms’ wage bill.
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fect innovative capacity and productivity growth, but only
firms’ willingness to hire new workers and, thus, the level
of unemployment. In addition, temporary work might lead
to other advantages, as they might allow firms to decrease
costs (Houseman 2001), a more efficient screening to se-
lect better workers (Wang and Weiss 1998; Autor 2001) or
represent a buffer to take advantage of short-term positive
shocks (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Goux et al. 2001).
As we will see later, there is some empirical evidence sup-
porting these theoretical predictions, especially for the case
of temporary agency workers (TAW). Nevertheless, there
is an increasing body of literature reasoning that TE might
potentially affect labour productivity. Hereunder, we briefly
discuss a few major channels between TE and productivity3,
following the recent literature on labour market flexibiliza-
tion (e. g., Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010; Kleinknecht et al.
2014).
Firstly, temporary workers might be less willing to co-
operate with their employers in developing innovations, as
they presumably will not enjoy in any way the expected
benefit from them (Kleinknecht 1998). Indeed, this argu-
ment might be especially relevant for TAW, who are not
formally workers of the user firm. Furthermore, temporary
workers might be more inclined to develop general skills,
which increase their future employability in the labour
market, than firm-specific skills if there is no long-term
commitment with employers (MacLeod and Navakachara
2007). Moreover, the option of hiring new temporary
workers implies that firms have no incentive to invest in
“functional” (internal) flexibility, which instead might be
favourable to develop innovation and enhance productivity
growth (Michie and Sheehan 2003; Zhou et al. 2011).
Therefore, a significant presence of TE might potentially
frustrate firms’ innovative capacity.
Another channel of transmission through which TE
might negatively affect productivity is the presumable
negative effect on workforce training. In fact, temporary
contracts are of too short duration, thereby reducing the
firms’ incentive to invest in training, given the short pay-
back period of the investment for fixed-term workers and,
even more so, for TAW. However, if firms confine tem-
porary workers to jobs requiring low qualification and/or
low experience, the impact on productivity of their lower
training may be negligible. In this respect, several em-
pirical studies tend to confirm that temporary workers in
European countries have less access to on-the-job training
provided by firms (Alba-Ramirez 1994; Booth et al. 2002;
OECD 2007; Albert et al. 2005, 2010). Nonetheless, the
cross-country evidence provided by Bassanini et al. (2005)
3 For a discussion on the major channels through which “wage” flexi-
bility reforms could potentially affect productivity growth, see Vergeer
and Kleinknecht (2014).
shows that the negative correlation between temporary
contracts and lower training is strongly due to the inclusion
of Spain in the sample, while excluding this country the
correlation does not longer hold.4
Previous literature on personnel economics suggests
that “high-trust” human resource management practices
can generate favourable productivity effects (Lorenz 1999;
Buchele and Christiansen 1999; Naastepad and Storm
2006). According to these theories, long-lasting work-
ing relations are an investment in trust and commitment
between employees and employers, which might boost
productivity growth. On the opposite, temporary contracts
might be interpreted as a firms’ choice to not commit in
long-lasting relations and, thus, TE might dampen pro-
ductivity. However, because temporary employment helps
the adjustment of workforce to address demand shocks,
temporary work might have a positive effect on labour
productivity (Hagen 2003).
Finally, looking at the workers’ effort as a relevant com-
ponent of total factor productivity (TFP), in countries where
“temp-to-perm” conversion rates are low and, thus, employ-
ers appear to use TE more as a cheaper form of job (House-
man 2001; Booth et al. 2002; Güell and Petrongolo 2007;
Garz 2013), it might be rationale for temporary workers
to exert a lower effort respect to permanent workers (Lisi
2012; Dolado et al. 2016), eventually reducing productiv-
ity. This might be especially true for TAW, for which the
evidence in the literature does not lend empirical support to
the stepping stone hypothesis (Kvasnicka 2009; Autor and
Housman 2010).
In analysing the impact of temporary work on absen-
teeism, however, Jimeno and Toharia (1996) and Ichino and
Riphahn (2005) find that the threat of losing their jobs de-
creases absenteeism in temporary workers respect to those
with open-ended contracts. In a similar vein, Malo and
Sánchez-Sánchez (2014) reason that, as temporary work-
ers have a higher probability of losing their jobs than per-
manent workers, they have a lower probability of being
involved in labour conflicts with a positive effect on labour
productivity.
Therefore, the impact of temporary employment on
labour productivity remains ambiguous at theoretical level
and might depend on their use and amount in the specific
firms and sectors, which calls for the empirical evidence.
4 In this regard, Albert et al. (2005) find that temporary workers in
Spain are less likely to be employed by firms providing training and,
furthermore, they have a lower probability of being trained when hired
in firms providing training activities.
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2.2 Previous evidence
The empirical literature on the impact of temporary employ-
ment on productivity is rather large, and different (and not
converging) empirical findings have emerged, depending
also on the type of temporary employment. A few previous
studies as Arvanitis (2005) and Nielen and Schiersch (2016)
find no effects of temporary contracts using panel data at the
firm level. On the other hand, Damiani and Pompei (2010)
analyze multi-factor productivity across European countries
and, as for the effect of temporary contracts, they find mixed
results. In particular, though they find a negative impact of
fixed-term arrangements, they also underline that labour
provisions for the protection of fixed-term contracts may
offset the negative effects deriving from a pure increase in
temporary workers. The evidence seems more convergent
on the positive impact of temporary agency work (TAW)
on productivity (Bryson, 2013). Specifically, Hirsch and
Mueller (2012) and Nielen and Schiersch (2014) find an
inversely u-shaped relationship between the share of TAW
and firms’ performance. This interesting finding appears
well-grounded in the argument that a low share of TE within
a firm could be a means of enhancing numerical flexibility
(Vidal and Tigges 2009) and screening new workers (Au-
tor 2001), whereas a high share of TE could be a signal
of a broader substitution between perms to temps, which
is likely to lower the motivation and commitment of the
workforce. In this respect, however, Nielen and Schiersch
(2016) show that the same inversely u-shaped effect does
not emerge for temporary contracts. Therefore, productivity
effects of temporary employment may depend on their use
and type in the economy or in the specific sector.
Nevertheless, in the last years many empirical studies
find evidence supporting the arguments on negative effects
of flexible jobs on productivity. For instance, Auer et al.
(2005) find a positive relationship between job tenure and
labour productivity. Similarly, in a panel of EU countries
Lisi (2013) finds that an increase of the share of flexible
jobs would lead to a decrease in labour productivity growth,
even after controlling for the potential endogeneity of TE
in the productivity equation.
Among country-specific studies, Kleinknecht et al.
(2006) find a not significant impact of temporary con-
tracts in Dutch manufacturing firms as a whole, but they
also find different results when they distinguish between
innovative and non-innovative firms. Among innovators,
temporary employment seems to have no effect on labour
productivity growth; on the other hand, among non-inno-
vating firms a higher rate of people on temporary contracts,
as well as more workers hired from private manpower
agencies, decreases labour productivity growth. However,
these estimated effects are hardly significant at conven-
tional levels, with the exception of the negative effect of
temporary contracts among non-innovators. Still in the
Netherlands, Kleinknecht et al. (2014) find that high shares
of temporary workers have a negative impact on the firms’
investment in R&D, especially in those sectors with a “rou-
tinised” innovation regime. Looking at the Italian context,
Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) find a negative effect of the
share of fixed-term contracts on labour productivity growth
in a sample of manufacturing firms. Similarly, Lucidi and
Kleinknecht (2010) show that high shares of flexible work-
ers, high labour turnover and lower costs of labour are
significantly related to lower labour productivity growth.
Cappellari et al. (2012) look specifically at the two Italian
reforms concerning the “external” flexibility, concluding
that while the reform of apprenticeship had a positive
impact on productivity, the reform of fixed-term contract
generated a negative effect on productivity. Finally, Ortega
and Marchante (2010) analyse the impact of the increase
in the use of TE in Spain, finding that productivity growth
has been slowed down by the extensive use of temporary
contracts as a regular form of jobs.
Overall, all these studies estimate an average effect of TE
on productivity.5 However, there are good reasons to suspect
that the impact of TE could differ significantly according
to sectors’ skill intensity, as the different channels of trans-
mission through which TE affects productivity could have
a different role according to skills’ intensity by industry.
For instance, we argued that temporary workers might
be more inclined to develop general skills than firm-spe-
cific skills (MacLeod and Navakachara 2007), and this
might affect labour productivity differently among indus-
tries according to the relative importance of specific human
capital respect to general human capital in each industry.
Furthermore, a lack of on-the-job training for temporary
workers implies low levels of skill acquisition (Ortega and
Marchante 2010), and this potential cost could be higher in
those sectors in which work-related training has more im-
portance. Similarly, as mentioned before, Bassanini et al.
(2005) find a significant correlation between temporary
contracts and training only when including Spain in their
sample; therefore, how the lower access to training of
temporary workers affects productivity remains an empir-
ical issue. Finally, temporary contracts provide different
incentives respect to permanent ones and, thus, temporary
workers might exert a different effort in their jobs (Dolado
et al. 2016), which might affect labour productivity differ-
ently according to sectors’ skill intensity.
5 The only exception appears to be Ortega and Marchante (2010),
which state that the effect of TE on productivity growth “... has only
been detected in the manufacturing and energy sector, in contrast to
low-technology low-human capital sectors ...”, in line with the fol-
lowing results in our paper. Respect to Ortega and Marchante (2010),
however, our following estimates do not refer to a specific country, but
to a large panel of EU countries.
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Interestingly, the different arguments on the differential
effect of TE between skilled and unskilled sectors would
seem to depend on the way in which temporary contracts
are used in the labour market. In particular, in skilled sec-
tors the use of TE might potentially be more oriented to-
wards screening new workers respect to unskilled ones, and
this perspective could induce in temporary workers a higher
motivation to develop firm-specific skills and exert higher
effort (Engellandt and Riphahn 2005), as well as a higher
firms’ willingness to provide on-the-job training. On the
other hand, if TE is used in the market as a structural
cheaper form of job, in skilled sectors the cost in terms
of lack of workforce training and lower workers’ effort
could be heavier, leading to an even greater effect in labour
productivity growth (Dolado et al. 2016).
The opposite arguments concerning the differential effect
of TE on productivity call for the empirical analysis. In
the following, we aim to contribute to this literature by
explicitly considering the differential effect of TE in skilled
and unskilled sectors.6
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we show the empirical strategy employed
in the study to disentangle the impact of TE across sectors
and, in particular, we describe the method used to divide
industries between skilled and unskilled sectors. Then, we
discuss the main advantages, but also the potential draw-
backs, of our empirical specification.
In our empirical analysis, we modify earlier productivity
equations in the literature (Bassanini and Venn 2008; Bas-
sanini et al. 2009; Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010; Lisi 2013),
adapting the model to estimate the differential impact of TE
across sectors. Our starting point is that the impact of TE
on productivity might not be homogenous across sectors
and, in particular, we wonder if the effect differs accord-
ing to sectors’ skill intensity. Therefore, dividing industries
between skilled sectors (S) and unskilled sectors (US), we
specify the following assumption (1) according to which
the difference between the conditional expected productiv-
ity growth in the S group and in the US group is some
function of the share of TE:
lnySi t − lny
US




6 The reader will note that we do not have data to disentangle the
separate effect of each abovementioned channel through which TE
might affect labour productivity. However, as highlighted by Lucidi
and Kleinknecht (2010), even if such data were available, one would
encounter substantial multi-collinearity problems, given that all chan-
nels between TE and productivity appear to work in the same direction.
where the first element indicates the conditional expected
productivity growth in the S group in country i at time t,
the second one the same for the US group and TE is the
share of TE in country i in sector j at time t. In partic-
ular, the productivity growth in (1) are conditional in the
sense that our assumption is valid after that all the other ex-
planatory variables affecting productivity growth have been
netted out; on the other hand, productivity growth are ex-
pected in the sense that in (1) they are the average across
all sectors within the two groups. Finally, notice that with
respect to the standard diff-in-diff assumption where only
observations in the treatment group are treated, in our case
we assume that is the impact of the treatment to be different
between the two groups. To this extent, our assumption is
very close to the spirit of the method introduced by Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998) to evaluate the impact of market
regulations.
From the empirical perspective, to divide industries be-
tween skilled sectors (S) and unskilled sectors (US) we
compute the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers
in each sector for different years and, then, we consider
the mean across time as a general index of sector’s skill
intensity (see e. g., Haskel and Slaughter 2002). Finally, we
take the mean of these indexes across sectors and consider
(un)skilled those sectors with a skill intensity (lower) higher
than the average. This procedure leads us to the binary in-
dicator SSIIj, which is equal to 1 if j is a skilled sector and















for eachj = 1; 2; :::; J (2)
This indicator SSIIj will be used in the productivity equa-
tion to disentangle the effect of the share of TE between
skilled and unskilled sectors.
To make our results easily comparable with previous
studies, we estimate also the impact of labour market reg-
ulation for regular workers, using the EPL index for PE
as explanatory variable. As standard in this literature, to
estimate the impact of EPL for PE we follow the method
introduced in the finance literature by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), then extended in labour (Bassanini and Venn 2007,
2008). The main assumption of this approach is that, while
the degree of labour market regulation is equal for all indus-
tries in a country, the impact of it could be different among
industries, according to some “physiological” characteris-
tics of each sector. In particular, we expect that EPL is more
binding in those industries characterized by a higher need
K
D. Lisi, M. A. Malo
to reallocate resources7 and, accordingly, in the productivity
equation we interact the EPL for PE with the frictionless job
reallocation rate FJRj for each sector, depurated from labour
market frictions and aggregate shocks.8 More specifically,
the underlying assumption usually specified in the literature
is (Bassanini et al. 2009; Cingano et al. 2010; Lisi 2013):




which states that the difference between the conditional ex-
pected productivity growth in two sectors j and k, in coun-
try i at time t, is a function of the degree of regulation
weighted by the natural need of job reallocation in these
sectors.
Finally, as suggested by the Schumpeterian growth liter-
ature (Griffith et al. 2004, 2009; Aghion and Howitt 2006),
in our productivity equation at the industry level we in-
clude the lagged productivity gap between each observa-
tion and the industry leader, to control for possible catch-
ing-up. Indeed, the inclusion of the productivity gap should
control also for exceptional fluctuations in capacity utilisa-
tion, which might be important to capture strongly mislead-
ing productivity increases (Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010).
Similarly, a few papers in the literature (Griffith et al. 2004,
2009; Bassanini and Venn 2007; Bassanini et al. 2009) sug-
gest that the model of productivity growth for nonfrontier
industries (i. e. for those observations at the industry level
that are not on the frontier) should include as explanatory
variable the contemporaneous productivity growth of the
industry leader; specifically, this would require to include
the contemporaneous productivity growth of the industry
leader in the complete model (i. e. including nonfrontier
and frontier industries) imposing the frontier growth term
equal to 0 for the industry leaders.9
7 For instance, as argued in Lisi (2013) “... if firms in a sector need to
lay off workers in response to changes in technologies or product de-
mand, a stricter EPL could slow the pace of reallocation. By contrast,
in industries where changes are less frequent or where firms can real-
locate labour through internal adjustments, EPL could be expected to
have little impact on reallocation and, in turn, on productivity ...”.
8 To obtain the frictionless job reallocation rate FJRj for each sec-
tor, we follow the method developed by Ciccone and Papaioannou
(2006) and, then, employed by different previous studies in this lit-
erature (e. g., Cingano et al. 2010; Lisi 2013). In particular, we regress
the actual job reallocation rates at industry level on industry dummies
j , industry dummies interacted with the EPL index for PE j EPLit
and country-time dummies #it : JRijt = j + j EPLit + #it + vijt .
The presence of country-time dummies #it should control for any
time-varying differences across countries, whereas the interaction term
j EPLit should absorb the effect of market regulation on job reallo-
cation rate, allowing us to obtain an appropriate estimate FJRj = bj
of natural rate of job reallocation in each industry.
9 As suggested by Griffith et al. (2004) “... Augmenting the specifi-
cation for nonfrontier countries with an additional term in contempo-
raneous frontier TFP growth allows for a more flexible relationship
between nonfrontier and frontier TFP ...”; thus, for the sake of comple-
Therefore, if we assume a linear functional form f in (1)
and (3), the main specification of our empirical model is
(Bassanini and Venn 2007, 2008; Lisi 2013):















+ Xijt + i + 't + "ijt
(4)
where the dependent variable is the productivity growth
(either labour productivity or TFP) in country i in sector j
in year t (measured as logarithmic difference). Then, the
explanatory variables include:
● the productivity growth of the industry productivity
leader lnyLjt ,








● the share of temporary employment TEijt ,
● the EPL index for regular worker EPLi t ,
● other control variables affecting productivity growth
Xijt , such as trade union density (TUD) and product
market regulation (PMR)10, including also the capital-to-
labour growth lnkijt when the empirical model (4) is
for labour productivity11,
● vectors of country i and time-specific 't fixed effects.
In our model,  is the main coefficient of interest, the
differential impact of TE on productivity growth in skilled
sectors compared to unskilled ones. On the other hand, ı
represents the impact of TE in unskilled sectors, and its
inclusion is important since it allows the differential impact
 to adjust upon a non-zero impact in unskilled sectors.
teness, we decided to include also this term in our productivity equati-
on. However, all estimates with the inclusion of industry-specific fixed
effects instead of the productivity growth of the industry leader pro-
duce a very similar pattern of results. Indeed, the limited influence of
the contemporaneous productivity growth of the industry leader in the
estimates is fully in line with the previous evidence in the literature
(see e. g., Griffith et al. 2004, 2009; Bassanini et al. 2009).
10 We also tried to include some other explanatory variable poten-
tially relevant in explaining productivity growth, such as tax wedge
and unemployment benefits. Overall, they appear not significant, even
if in some specifications without the EPL index and TUD they are
significant. Indeed, this is not surprising given the high cross-coun-
try correlations among labour market institutions in OECD countries
(OECD 2007; Bassanini et al. 2009). We therefore suspect that this
result emerges because of multicollinearity and, for this reason, we
preferred to keep them out from our estimates.
11 Notice that, as shown in the previous literature on industry-level
productivity equation (see e. g., Bassanini and Venn 2007, 2008; Lisi
2013), when we consider the labour productivity growth as dependent
variable in (4), the empirical model (4) is derived directly from an in-
dustry-level Cobb-Douglas production function and, thus, it includes
the capital-labour ratio as regressor.
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Looking at the impact of the EPL index for PE,  is the
marginal impact of EPL in a sector with a relative high FJR
compared to a sector with a relatively low FJR; this implies
that, if the estimated coefficient is negative, productivity
growth in high FJR sectors decreases with respect to that
in low FJR ones, meaning that EPL for PE have a negative
impact on productivity growth (Cingano et al. 2010).
A potential drawback of specification (4) is that it pro-
duces consistent estimates under the strictly exogeneity of
all covariates, which might not be the case in our empirical
analysis. In particular, to the extent that hiring a tempo-
rary worker is a firm’s decision, the share of TE might be
endogenous in the productivity equation. Therefore, follow-
ing Lisi (2013) we perform also an IV-strategy, using the
EPL index for TE as an instrumental variable for the share
of TE.12 In particular, the main idea in our IV-strategy is
that the country legislation concerning the use of tempo-
rary contracts certainly affect the share of TE, like so the
variation of the legislation affects the share over time. In
this regard, the EPL index for TE turns out to be signifi-
cantly correlated (p-value = 0.000) with the share of TE in
our sample. Differently, the legislation about TE should not
have any impact on productivity except for the actual use of
temporary contracts; in fact, as long as temporary contracts
are not used in the labour market, a change in the legislation
would be expected to have no impact on productivity.13
We estimate several versions of our model, consider-
ing both labour productivity and TFP as dependent vari-
able. Following the previous literature (Bassanini et al.
2009; Lucidi and Kleinknecht 2010), we have also repeated
all our estimates including a vector of industry-specific
fixed effects instead of the contemporaneous productivity
growth of the industry leader, without changing at all our
results. Moreover, as a few previous studies find an in-
versely u-shaped productivity effect of TAW (Hirsch and
Mueller 2012; Nielen and Schiersch 2014), we also estimate
12 As a standard practice with an interaction term with endogenous
regressors (i. e. TE*SSII), in our IV estimates we use the interaction
term EPL index for TE*SSII as an instrument for the differential effect
TE*SSII.
13 As standard in the IV-procedure, while we can easily test for the
correlation between instrument and instrumented variable, we cannot
test for the exogeneity condition of our instrument. Nonetheless, in
the literature this kind of instrument (index measuring the strictness
of a national legislation) tend to be considered strictly exogenous in
the productivity equation, because their effect should be only indirect
and, in particular, generated only by the change induced in the specific
object of the regulation (in our case, the EPL index for TE should in-
duce an effect in productivity growth only by the change induced in the
share of TE). For example, OECD (2004) and Bassanini et al. (2009)
use the EPL index for TE following the same argument, whereas Am-
able and Ledezma (2013) use the product market regulation index as
an exogenous instrumental variable. Moreover, in a previous general
article on temporary work and productivity, the EPL index for TE has
already been used in IV estimations (Lisi 2013).
model (4) adding the quadratic term of the share of TE, to
test whether the interaction term TE*SSII picks up the ef-
fect of non-linearity of TE in the productivity equation and,
thus, leads to a wrong inference on the differential effect of
TE among sectors. Finally, we provide different sensitivity
checks, concerning the sectors’ skill intensity index and the
sample used in our estimates, to test the robustness of our
findings.
Overall, our empirical specifications follow the previous
literature on the topic. However, instead of estimating an
average impact of TE across sectors, in our paper we esti-
mate the differential impact of TE according to sectors’ skill
intensity. On the one hand, this should provide a more accu-
rate description of the impact of TE; on the other hand, the
investigation of this differential impact might offer some
insight on how temporary contracts are currently used in
the labour market (that is, least-cost way of screening new
workers or cheaper form of job).
A troubling point in our empirical analysis regards the
specifications using labour productivity as dependent vari-
able. Indeed, while the model for TFP follows the intent
to explain what factors affect its law of motion, the em-
pirical model (4) for labour productivity is derived directly
from an industry-level Cobb-Douglas production function,
which clearly includes also the capital-labour ratio.14 In this
respect, however, previous studies in this literature (OECD
2007; Bassanini and Venn 2008; Cingano et al. 2010; Cap-
pellari et al. 2012) have estimated reduced-form models
as (4) for labour productivity omitting the capital-labour
ratio, in order to capture the overall effect of the policy of
interest on labour productivity. On the other hand, differ-
ent papers focusing on firm-level production function have
shown that omitting capital-labour ratio as regressor in the
empirical model for labour productivity could bias the esti-
mates (e. g., Levinson and Petrin 2003). Therefore, in order
to provide a robust evidence on the differential effect of
TE, in our empirical analysis we provide estimates both
with and without the capital-labour ratio in the model for
labour productivity.
A potential drawback of our empirical specification is
related to our assumption concerning the differential effect
of TE across sectors. In particular, if the use of TE changes
extensively the skill composition of our sectors (i. e. the so-
called “composition effect”, see Sect. 4) and, in turn, the
selection of them in S- and US-sectors, then our assumption
would not be useful anymore. In fact, in that case we are
not exploiting the exogenous variation on the impact of TE
between S- and US-sectors, because groups themselves are
endogenously determined by the share of TE. Differently,
14 For a formal derivation of the empirical model (4) from an industry-
level Cobb-Douglas production function, see e. g. Bassanini and Venn
(2007) and Lisi (2013).
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if sectors’ skill composition and, in turn, S- and US-groups
are exogenously set by sectors’ production functions, then
our specification should allow us to estimate consistently
the differential impact of TE across sectors.
Indeed, in line with the previous literature (e. g., OECD
2007; Cappellari et al. 2012) the clear picture emerging
from our data is that the correlation between the share of
TE and sectors’ skill composition is almost null. In particu-
lar, in Fig. 1 we report the scatter plot between TE and SSI
and, as we can see, the cloud would suggest that there is
no correlation. Furthermore, the small and statistically in-
significant correlation coefficient (	= –0.037) also indicates
that there is no correlation between TE and SSI. Therefore,
the different skill composition across sectors would seem
more driven by the technology underpinning the production
function in each sector, which leads us to pursue our em-
pirical strategy to estimate the differential impact of TE on
productivity.
Finally, a potential problem in our IV strategy concerns
the source of variation which is exploited in the productivity
equation through the use of our instrument (i. e. the EPL
index for TE). Specifically, if the legislation on the use of
TE is strongly correlated with the social and cultural traits
in a country, then the variation in the share of TE induced
by a difference in the EPL index for TE among countries
may retrace differences in the social and cultural aspects
that may, in turn, affect productivity. If this is the case,
indeed, the source of variation exploited in our IV-strategy
might not be useful anymore, as it might be already included
in our productivity equation (4) through the inclusion of
country fixed effects i , potentially capturing also social
and cultural aspects of a country. On the contrary, if the
EPL index for TE is not (or only slightly) correlated with
the social and cultural traits of countries in our sample,
then the variation we exploit in the IV-strategy would not
be included in the productivity equation (4) and, thus, it
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Fig. 1 Correlation between TE and SSI
in the share of TE allowing us to estimate consistently the
impact of TE on productivity.
In this regard, following the previous literature on this
topic (e. g., Tabellini 2008, 2010; Aghion et al. 2010; OECD
2011; Charron et al. 2014, 2015), we found six indicators
concerning social and cultural traits under different perspec-
tives, for all European countries in our sample.15 Overall,
the EPL index for TE turns out to be not (or very slightly)
correlated with the abovementioned indicators of social and
cultural traits16, suggesting that the variation exploited in
our IV-strategy should represent a valuable source of vari-
ation to estimate the impact of TE in the productivity equa-
tion (4). Moreover, in Sect. 5 we provide the results of
different statistical tests supporting further the use of our
instrument.
4 Database and main variables
In our empirical analysis, we use an industry-level panel of
EU countries. As emphasized by the previous literature, the
advantage of using a panel of industry-level data is fourfold.
First, not only the cross-country variation is still exploited,
but also the variation on the impact of policies in different
industries. Second, in contrast to the cross-country analysis,
it potentially allows to control for unobserved fixed effects.
Third, as the previous literature emphasised (e. g., OECD
2007) and as confirmed by our preliminary evidence (see
Sect. 3), the within-industry “composition effect” appears
to be negligible, allowing us to capture the “independent
effect” of TE.17 Fourth, to the extent that events in a single
15 The issue of the indicators of social and cultural traits in a coun-
try has been always a big challenge in the literature (for a discussion
on this issue, see e. g., Tabellini 2008, 2010) and, indeed, it is difficult
to find indicators available for all European countries in our sample.
In particular, the abovementioned six indicators of social and cultural
traits, looking at the cultural aspects of a country under different per-
spectives, are mainly based on the previous literature (e. g., Tabellini
2008, 2010; Aghion et al. 2010; OECD 2011, Charron et al. 2014,
2015): trust, the fraction of survey respondents believing that “most
people can be trusted” (Source: European Social Survey); respect, the
fraction of survey respondents who claim to consider “tolerance and re-
spect for others” as an important quality (Source: European Social Sur-
vey); pro-social behavior, averages responses to three questions about
whether the respondent has volunteered time, donated money to a char-
ity and helped a stranger in the last month (Source: Gallup World Poll);
average years of schooling (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics);
European quality of governance indicators 2010 and 2013 (Source:
Charron et al. 2014, 2015).
16 More specific results on the correlation between the EPL index for
TE and the abovementioned indicators of social and cultural traits are
available upon request form the authors.
17 In the literature the impact of a labour market policy on productivity
is usually divided into “composition effect” and “independent effect”.
The first is the effect on productivity associated with the change in
the composition of employment due to the policy variation (for instan-
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industry are not so relevant alone to affect the policy in
a country, the specification is less subject to the simultaneity
problem between the variable of interest and policy.
In particular, the dataset covers 10 sectors in 13 countries
over the years 1992–2007, for a balanced panel of 2080 ob-
servations. Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Since we make use of different data sources, we did some
aggregation and the final sectors classification is based on
the standard EUROSTAT classification (see Appendix B for
details). The sectors are the following: “Agriculture, hunting
and forestry”, “Manufacturing”, “Electricity, gas and wa-
ter supply”, “Construction”, “Wholesale and retail trade”,
“Hotels and restaurants”, “Transport, storage and commu-
nication”, “Financial intermediation”, “Real estate, renting
and business activities”, “Other community, social, personal
service activities”. With this sectors classification, we will
define two aggregate groups of skill intensity consisting of
five sectors with enough variability for our empirical anal-
ysis.
To collect our dataset we made use of different sources.
The data on labour productivity, total factor productivity
and employment level at the industry-level were collected
from EU KLEMS dataset (www.euklems.net). This com-
prehensive database contains data on economic growth, pro-
ductivity, employment and other variables at the industry-
level for all EU countries, providing an important source
for policy evaluation.
The labour productivity measure used is the “gross value
added per hour worked, volume indices, 1995 = 100”, de-





where VA is the gross value added in volumes and L is the
total amount of hours worked. Respect to other measures,
the index measure with value added in volumes has differ-
ent advantages and, in fact, it is the productivity measure
largely most used in the literature (OECD 2007; Bassanini
and Venn 2008; Cingano et al. 2010; Cappellari et al. 2012).
ce, an increase in the share of unskilled workers). The second is the
pure average effect of the policy on productivity (that is, ceteris pari-
bus) and, thus, it is often the effect of interest. In this regard, different
previous studies emphasize that “composition effects” are somewhat
relevant in the aggregate analysis and, indeed, they cannot be easily
dismissed. Therefore, any aggregate analysis of the impact of some
labour market policies on productivity hardly will be able to isolate
the “independent effect” of the policy and, in turn, to produce a useful
contribution for policy guidance. Differently, industry-level analyses
suggest that the within-industry “composition effects” are fairly negli-
gible (OECD 2007) and, therefore, the use of industry-level panel data
should succeed in capturing the “independent effect” of the policy.
Looking at the behaviour over time, the mean of labour pro-
ductivity in the entire sample is 110.94, whereas the mean
from 1995 (base year = 100) is 114.31, telling us that labour
productivity grew in EU countries, even if not so signifi-
cantly.
The other indicator we use for productivity is total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) or multi-factor productivity. In the
economic literature, this variable is obtained as a residual,
as it is defined as the effects on total output not caused by
the inputs considered in the aggregate production function
(typically, labour and capital). TFP is often seen as the main
driver of economic growth, mirroring the long-term techno-
logical change. The TFP measure used is the “TFP, 1995 =
100”.18 Unfortunately, no data on TFP at the industry-level
are available for Portugal; therefore, in the estimates con-
sidering TFP as dependent variable data for Portugal are not
included. Looking at the behaviour over time, the mean of
TFP in the entire sample is 103.74, whereas the mean from
1995 (base year = 100) is 104.96, telling us that TFP growth
in EU countries in the last years has been very scarce.
The data on capital stock were collected from OECD
STAN database, a comprehensive tool for analyzing indus-
trial performance across countries. In particular, the capital
stock measure used is the “CPGK – gross capital stock in
volume terms”. Unfortunately, no data on capital stock at
the industry-level are available for Ireland, Portugal and
Sweden; therefore, in the estimates including the capital-
labour ratio in the productivity equation these countries are
dropped.
The shares of TE at the industry-level were constructed
from EU Labour Force Survey launched by the EUROSTAT
(see Appendix A for details)19 and, as far as we know, it
is the only industry-level measure of TE available for such
large sample of countries. A potential limitation of this mea-
sure, however, is that it does not allow to distinguish be-
tween fixed-term contracts and temporary agency workers.
Indeed, as discussed in Sect. 2, these two types of temporary
employment might generate different effects on labour pro-
ductivity and, thus, distinguishing between them might be
relevant in our study. Moreover, though temporary agency
employment levels grew strongly in all European countries
over the period (CIETT 2009), still the use of TAW is rather
heterogeneous among them (see Appendix B, Table B.4),
which implies that also the composition of TE is somewhat
mixed in our sample. In fact, while in a few countries TAW
represent a significant part of temporary employment as
18 The two productivity measures correspond respectively to LP_I and
TFPva_I in EU KLEMS database.
19 The EUROSTAT definition of temporary contracts is the follow-
ing: “Employees with temporary contracts are those who declare them-
selves as having a fixed term employment contract or a job which will
terminate if certain objective criteria are met, such as completion of an
assignment or return of the employee who was temporarily replaced”.
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in the United Kingdom (64%) and France (16%), in other
countries as in Spain (2%), Portugal (4%) and Italy (6%)
the use of temporary work agency appears to be less rele-
vant, despite they exhibit among the highest share of TE in
Europe. Therefore, a bit of caution in the interpretation of
our results and in the subsequent policy implications seems
appropriate.
As for the behaviour of TE in our sample, the mean and
standard deviation of the share of TE are respectively 0.12
and 0.10, confirming that TE is an important feature of the
labour market landscape in Europe by this time, but its im-
portance differs significantly across countries. For instance,
while in countries as Spain (0.32) and Portugal (0.16) the
share of TE is far away from the mean, in the UK the mean
is no more than 0.06 (see Appendix B, Table B.3). Interest-
ingly, the share of TE turns out to be negatively correlated
with labour productivity and total factor productivity, both
cross-country (	LPi = −0.2972, 	TFPi = −0.3224) and cross-
industry (	LPj = −0.4836, 	TFPj = −0.2481).
To construct our sectors’ skill intensity index, we divide
workers between skilled and unskilled using two main indi-
cators. Indeed, the idea initially was to use more than two
indicators, to test as much as possible our results. How-
ever, all other plausible indicators led us to the same di-
chotomy among sectors of those two. For both indicators
the data are collected from Science, technology and innova-
tion database (EUROSTAT), which collects data from many
different publications on these themes as R&D expenditure,
workers knowledge, HRST, innovations.
The first indicator concerns the level of education and
we consider skilled those workers with a tertiary education
(level 5–6 ISCED 1997). Differently, the second indicator
concerns the kind of task workers make in their job. In par-
ticular, the database gives us these values as a share of total
employment, for each sector from 2001 to 2007. Notice
that, actually, the time period of our analysis is wider than
2001–2007; unfortunately, data availability on the above
mentioned indicators prevents us to construct our SSII us-
ing the same time period. Therefore, in our empirical analy-
sis we are forced to rely on the assumption that 2001–2007
represents a consistent time period to split the industries,
which could potentially be reasonable but still we need to
rely on this assumption in our empirical analysis. In this re-
gard, the idea to employ more than one indicator has been
also driven by the intent to test our results by an alternative
subdivision of sectors. Overall, these two indicators lead
us to a similar, but still slightly different, subdivision of
sectors (see Appendix B).
As measure of EPL for PE we made use of the cardinal
index constructed by OECD (2004). In our sample from
1992 to 2007 the EPL index for PE ranges from 4.33 in
Portugal (1992–2003) to 0.95 in the UK (1992–1999). The
mean of the index follows a slightly decreasing trend, going
from 2.47 to 2.33 at the end of the sample. However, the
decreasing trend in the stringency of regulation of PE is far
from being common to all countries, rather it seems to be
driven by Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, the EPL
index for TE ranges from 5.38 in Italy (1992–1996) to 0.25
in the UK (1992–2001). Similarly to PE, the mean of the
index for TE follows a decreasing trend, going from 2.92
to 1.86. But differently to PE, this decreasing trend seems
to be a common feature in fairly all EU countries.
Data on trade union density were collected from
ICTWSS database, providing information on institutional
characteristics of trade unions in 34 countries between 1960
and 2007. In particular, the variable used is “the ratio of
wage and salary earners that are trade union members, di-
vided by the total number of wage and salary earners”. The
mean in the sample is 0.40, telling us how trade union are
still an important subject in Europe. However, the standard
deviation of 0.23 suggests how different is its importance
across EU countries. Finally, product market regulation
indicators used are the OECD Indicators of PMR, a com-
prehensive set of indicators measuring the degree to which
policies promote or inhibit competition. In our sample PMR
exhibits much variation, revealing that these policies are
not homogenous in Europe.
A full description of variables and sources can be found
in Appendix A, whereas different descriptive statistics, pen-
etration rates of TAW among countries and the subdivisions
of sectors between skilled and unskilled are reported in Ap-
pendix B.
5 Discussion of results
In this section, we present and discuss the main results
of the empirical analysis. Table 1 shows the estimates
from different specifications of model (4). In particular,
columns (1) to (3) use labour productivity as dependent
variable, whereas (4) to (6) use TFP. Then, in Table 2 we
provide the estimates of the model for labour productivity
including the capital-labour ratio.
More specifically, in column (1) we report the coeffi-
cients of the baseline model, a POLS regression without
any fixed effects. Both point estimates of TE and TE*SSII
are negative and significant, suggesting that TE is even more
damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative effect signifi-
cantly heavier than in unskilled sectors. Similarly, the point
estimate of EPL*FJR is negative and significant, confirm-
ing the previous evidence on the negative effect of EPL
for PE (Bassanini et al. 2009; Cingano et al. 2010). Both
the growth of productivity frontier and relative productivity
gap appear to be significantly associated with productivity
growth with the expected sign; moreover, estimated coeffi-
cients seem to be in line with estimates found in the pre-
vious literature (Griffith et al. 2004, 2009; Bassanini et al.
2009). In particular, the negative sign of the relative pro-
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Table 1 Temporary employment and productivity growth
 Log LP  Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POLS FE IV POLS FE IV


































































































COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES NO YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES NO YES YES
SECTOR DUMMIES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Endogeneity Testa – – p-val = 0.02 – – p-val = 0.10
F-statisticsb – – 59.971 – – 71.132
Observations 1950 1950 1950 1800 1800 1800
R-squared 0.115 0.191 0.431 0.117 0.168 0.247
POLS pooled ordinary least squares, FE fixed effects (dummy variable regression), IV instrumental variable, EPL employment protection legisla-
tion, FJR frictionless job reallocation, TE the share of temporary employment, TUD trade union density, PMR product market regulation
HAC Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
aThe endogeneity test is the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments and one for the
equation with the larger set of instruments. Unlike the Hausman tests, this statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
bF-statistic of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test for weak identification
ductivity gap suggests the presence of catching-up effects
in productivity growth. Finally, the coefficient of PMR also
appears to be significant, suggesting that product market
regulations have a negative effect on productivity growth
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). While these estimates are
useful to get an insight on the direction of the effect, they
cannot be interpreted as consistent, given the omitted vari-
able bias and the potential endogeneity of TE in the pro-
ductivity equation.
Therefore, in column (2) we introduce a large set of
country and time-specific fixed effects, controlling for in-
stitutional and time differentials in productivity growth, al-
lowed to be correlated with other explanatory variables.
Still, the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII are negative and
significant. Similarly, all other estimated coefficients main-
tain the same sign, but now also the coefficient of TUD ap-
pear significant, suggesting that a higher share of unionized
employees has a negative effect on productivity growth. Fi-
nally, in column (3) we report the estimates of our IV model,
where we use the EPL index for TE as an instrument for the
share of TE (and EPL*SSII for TE*SSII), along with the
results of different tests. As we can see, the endogeneity test
in Table 1 tends to confirm that the share of TE is, indeed,
endogenous in the productivity equation, implying that we
need to implement the IV-strategy to estimate consistently
the impact of TE (Lisi 2013). Likewise, the Kleibergen-
Paap weak identification test reports a significantly high
value of the F-statistic20, saying that the EPL index for TE
and its interaction with SSII are not weak instruments in
20 As for the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic, Baum et al. (2007)
suggest to apply the critical values for the F-statistic reported in Stata
provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). In particular, if we are willing to
accept an actual rejection rate of 10% (the lowest tabulated in Stata),
the critical value for the F-statistic is 16.38. Therefore, the Kleibergen-
Paap statistic of 59.971 in (3) indicates that the EPL index for TE and
its interaction with SSII are not weak instruments in our IV estimate.
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COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES
SECTOR DUMMIES NO NO YES
Endogeneity Testa – – p-val = 0.01
F-statisticsb – – 30.983
Observations 1500 1500 1500
R-squared 0.189 0.246 0.511
POLS pooled ordinary least squares, FE fixed effects (dummy variable regression), IV instrumental variable, EPL employment protection legisla-
tion, FJR frictionless job reallocation, TE the share of temporary employment, TUD trade union density, PMR product market regulation
HAC Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
aThe endogeneity test is the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments and one for the
equation with the larger set of instruments. Unlike the Hausman tests, this statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
bF-statistic of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test for weak identification
our IV estimate. Nonetheless, even if different in magni-
tude respect to (2), both the estimated coefficients of TE
and TE*SSII are still negative and significant. Similarly,
all other estimated coefficients maintain the same sign and,
furthermore, in (3) both the coefficient of TUD and PMR
appear to be significant.
Since we are able to control for several unobserved fac-
tors, as well as for the endogeneity of the share of TE, we
interpret the estimated effects as consistent and, in partic-
ular, the coefficient of TE*SSII as the differential effect
of temporary employment on productivity growth between
skilled and unskilled sectors. Our central result is that TE
is even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative
effect significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors. Specif-
ically, an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of TE
in skilled sectors would lead to a decrease of about 1–1.5%
in labour productivity growth, whereas in unskilled ones
the reduction would be only of 0.5–0.8%.
Notice that, in Lisi (2013) it is found a higher aver-
age effect of TE respect to our results, that is a decrease
of about 2–3% in labour productivity. Indeed, this might
appear a remarkable difference considering that, apart from
the estimation of the differential effect of TE across sectors,
we employ a similar dataset and empirical method. More
specifically, the few differences respect to Lisi (2013) are
given by the inclusion of Schumpeterian variables and prod-
uct market regulation in the productivity equation, along
with a slightly (i. e. two years) longer time period of our
sample. In this regard, running the same IV estimate in Lisi
(2013) with our longer sample, we find fairly similar results
but a slightly lower average effect of TE (i. e. –0.233); on
the other hand, including the Schumpeterian variables and
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Table 3 Temporary employment and productivity growth (TE2–POLS)
 Log LP  Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POLS POLS POLS POLS












































































COUNTRY DUMMIES NO NO NO NO
YEAR DUMMIES NO NO NO NO
Observations 1950 1950 1800 1800
R-squared 0.103 0.116 0.065 0.117
POLS pooled ordinary least squares, EPL employment protection legislation, FJR frictionless job reallocation, TE the share of temporary employ-
ment, TUD trade union density, PMR product market regulation
HAC Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
product market regulation in the IV specification even in
the shorter sample (i. e. 1992–2005) leads to a significantly
lower effect of TE (i. e. –0.145). Overall, from our investi-
gation we can conclude that the lower estimated effect of
TE in our paper seems to be due especially to the inclusion
of Schumpeterian variables and product market regulation
in the productivity equation, while the different sample ap-
pears to explain only slightly the lower estimate of TE.21
Therefore, this seems to suggest that the estimated effects
of TE in this paper are a little more cautious, as they control
also for different factors affecting productivity.
Then, we wonder whether the estimated effects and, in
particular, the differential effect of TE hold also using TFP
as dependent variable. From the empirical perspective, the
question is legitimate because there are indeed theoretical
reasons for which labour market regulations might also af-
fect capital accumulation, even if potentially in both posi-
tive and negative directions (Bertola 1994; Saint-Paul 2002;
Samaniego 2006). Therefore, in columns (4) to (6) we re-
21 Full regressions on this specific point are available upon requests
from the authors.
port the same estimates using TFP as productivity variable.
Overall, we can see that fairly all the coefficients of inter-
est are significant with the expected sign. In particular, the
point estimates of TE and TE*SSII are negative and signif-
icant, confirming our result that TE is even more damaging
in skilled sectors, with a negative effect on productivity
growth significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors. Sim-
ilarly, the estimates for EPL*FJR, as well as for the Schum-
peterian growth variables, are also in line with our previous
estimates.
Finally, as discussed in Sect. 3, while the reduced-form
model (i. e. without capital-labour ratio) in Table 1 may
allow to capture the overall effect of TE on labour produc-
tivity (OECD 2007; Bassanini and Venn 2008; Cappellari
et al. 2012; Lisi 2013), omitting the capital-to-labour growth
in the model for labour productivity could produce biased
estimates (e. g., Levinson and Petrin 2003). Therefore, in
order to provide a robust evidence on the differential effect
of TE, in Table 2 we show the estimates of the model for
labour productivity including the capital-to-labour growth
as regressor. As we can see from Table 2, as expected the
coefficient of the capital-to-labour growth is always sig-
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Table 4 Temporary employment and productivity growth (TE2–FE)
 Log LP  Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE




































































COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1950 1950 1800 1800
R-squared 0.186 0.193 0.103 0.104
FE fixed effects (dummy variable regression), EPL employment protection legislation, FJR frictionless job reallocation, TE the share of temporary
employment, TUD trade union density, PMR product market regulation
HAC Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
nificant in the reasonable range of 0.2–0.3; however, even
if the inclusion of the capital-labour ratio slightly changes
the estimates, both TE and TE*SSII are still negative and
significant with a magnitude close to those in Table 1. Over-
all, the inclusion of the capital-labour ratio in the empirical
model for labour productivity, while it affects the estimated
coefficients of some explanatory variable, it does not seem
to change significantly our conclusion on the differential
effect of TE on productivity.
6 Robustness checks
As discussed in Sect. 2, a few previous studies in this litera-
ture (Hirsch and Mueller 2012; Nielen and Schiersch 2014)
find that TAW – i. e. a component of TE provided by EU
Labour Force Survey – generates an inversely u-shaped ef-
fect in the user firms’ productivity. This piece of evidence
appears well-grounded in the argument that a low share
of TAW within a firm could be a means of enhancing nu-
merical flexibility (Vidal and Tigges 2009) and screening
new workers (Autor 2001), whereas a high share of TAW
could be a signal of a broader substitution between perms to
temps, which is likely to lower the motivation and commit-
ment of the workforce (Hirsch and Mueller 2012). Although
this argument in an industry-level dataset is less clear, it is
still important in our analysis to control for the presence of
a non-linear effect of TE in the productivity equation, be-
cause the interaction term TE*SSII in our model (4) might
pick up the effect of non-linearity of TE, thus leading to
a wrong inference on the differential effect of TE among
sectors. Therefore, in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively for
POLS and FE models, we provide the estimates with the
quadratic term of TE in the productivity equation, using
both labour productivity and TFP as dependent variable.
In particular, in columns (1) and (3) of both tables, re-
spectively for labour productivity and TFP, we estimate our
productivity equation with the quadratic term of TE with-
out the interaction term, to check for the presence of a non-
linear effect of TE. As we can see in Table 3 and Table 4,
in all estimates the coefficient of the quadratic term re-
sults statistically insignificant; thus, they do not provide
evidence of a non-linear effect of TE, at least in our indus-
try-level panel. Then, in columns (2) and (4), respectively
for labour productivity and TFP, we add also the interac-
tion term TE*SSII, along with the quadratic term of TE.
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Table 5 Temporary employment and productivity growth (SSII2)
 Log LP  Log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POLS FE IV POLS FE IV


































































































COUNTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES NO YES YES
YEAR DUMMIES NO YES YES NO YES YES
SECTOR DUMMIES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 1950 1950 1950 1800 1800 1800
R-squared 0.102 0.189 0.432 0.126 0.186 0.249
POLS pooled ordinary least squares, FE fixed effects (dummy variable regression), IV instrumental variable, EPL employment protection legisla-
tion, FJR frictionless job reallocation, TE the share of temporary employment, TUD trade union density, PMR product market regulation
HAC Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Again, both in Table 3 and Table 4, the coefficients of the
quadratic term are statistically insignificant, while those of
TE*SSII are still negative and significant, confirming the
higher negative effect of TE in skilled sectors. Overall,
our findings would suggest that, at least in our industry-
level dataset, there is no evidence of a non-linear produc-
tivity effect of TE, regardless of the productivity measure
employed as dependent variable as well as the estimated
model.22 More importantly, the evidence in Table 3 and
Table 4 provides further support to our inference on the
22 Even if we do not find evidence of a non-linear effect of TE, our re-
sults should not be interpreted as in contrast with the previous studies
finding an inversely u-shaped effect of TE in the user firms’ productiv-
ity (Hirsch and Mueller 2012; Nielen and Schiersch 2014). Notice that,
in fact, while the above-mentioned argument on the inversely u-shaped
effect of TAW is certainly reasonable at the firm level, it is much less
clear at the industry level. Therefore, it is not surprising that in our
industry-level panel we do not find evidence of a non-linear effect of
TE, but clearly this does not mean that at the firm level the inversely
u-shaped argument is not valid. Moreover, while the evidence on the
inversely u-shaped productivity effect is strong for TAW, Nielen and
Schiersch (2016) find that the same inversely u-shaped effect does not
seem to emerge for fixed-term contracts, even at the firm level.
interaction term TE*SSII as the differential effect of TE
among sectors.
As for the sectors’ skill intensity index, to the extent
that a subdivision between skilled and unskilled sectors has
to be necessarily based on discretional criteria, in Table 5
we repeat the same estimates using a second sectors’ skill
intensity index, concerning the kind of task workers make
in their job (see Appendix A). This second index leads to
a similar, but slightly different, subdivision of sectors and,
therefore, represents a perfect candidate to test the stability
of our findings. As can be clearly seen from Table 5, this
change in the SSII used in the estimation does not change
our conclusions. Still, the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII2
are negative and significant, even with a magnitude very
close to those in Table 1. Looking at the other explanatory
variables, we can also see from Table 5 that the use of SSII2
does not change markedly the estimated effects.23
Finally, to check whether our results depend crucially on
the inclusion of some countries in the sample, we re-esti-
23 We have also estimated the specifications with SSII2 (available upon
request) with the capital-to-labour growth as regressor for labour pro-
ductivity, with results fully in line with those presented in Table 2.
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Fig. 2 Coefficients of TE and TE*SSII from the Reduced Sample
mate the model excluding all countries one-by-one. There-
fore, we run many FE and IV regressions, using labour
productivity as productivity variable24, where in each re-
gression we exclude one different country. Indeed, this fur-
ther robustness check should be especially relevant for the
issue of temporary contracts, since we have already seen
in Sect. 4 that the extent of TE is not homogeneous across
EU countries (see also, e. g., Boeri and Garibaldi 2007). In
particular, the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the sample
might potentially be important in driving our results, as both
countries not only have had the highest share of temporary
contracts for many years, but also they have implemented
reforms reducing considerably the protection of permanent
workers. In Fig. 2 are the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII,
arranged from the greatest to the smallest, for both FE and
IV.25
24 We have also run the same reduced sample regressions (available
upon request) using TFP as productivity variable, with results fully in
line with those presented in Fig. 2.
25 Full regressions are available upon request from the authors.
As Fig. 2 clearly shows, however, our results do not de-
pend on the sample of countries included in the estimation.
Indeed, both the coefficients of TE and TE*SSII are fairly
always negative and significant, even omitting Spain and
Portugal. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients
would seem to validate sufficiently our result that TE is
even more damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative ef-
fect significantly heavier than in unskilled sectors.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the effect of the share of
TE on productivity, explicitly considering the differential
effect in skilled and unskilled economic sectors. Our indus-
try-level panel of EU countries allowed to disentangle the
effect of the share of TE between skilled and unskilled sec-
tors, controlling also for different unobserved confounding
factors and the potential endogeneity of the share of TE
in the productivity equation. As discussed in the paper, the
empirical analysis on this question appears to be important,
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given that from a theoretical point of view is ambiguous
what sectors might be more affected by the use of tempo-
rary employment.
The main finding of the paper is that TE is even more
damaging in skilled sectors, with a negative effect signif-
icantly heavier than in unskilled sectors, robust to little
changes in the skill intensity index and in the sample used,
as well as to the inclusion of non-linearity in the effect of
TE. In particular, we find that an increase of 10 percentage
points of the share of TE in skilled sectors would lead to
a decrease of about 1–1.5% in labour productivity growth,
whereas in unskilled ones the reduction would be only of
0.5–0.8%. Finally, we find similar results in the productivity
equations with TFP growth as dependent variable.
Apart from offering a more accurate description of the
impact of TE, these results have important policy implica-
tions and, certainly, lead us to question if the actual Eu-
ropean regulation corresponds exactly to the lines of the
best practice. In particular, this evidence might support the
growing feeling that TE is currently used in fairly all in-
dustries more as a regular form of job to save on firms’
wage bill, much beyond the role of screening device (Booth
et al. 2002; Güell and Petrongolo 2007; Garz 2013). Con-
sequently, temporary employment seem to be related with
permanently high levels of workers’ rotation, damaging
productivity in all sectors but especially in skilled sectors,
where production uses skills more intensively. Therefore,
in line with recent literature on flexibilization and produc-
tivity (e. g., Lisi 2013; Kleinknecht et al. 2014; Vergeer and
Kleinknecht 2014), we also conclude that the extensive use
of flexible labour is not a free lunch not only for firms, but
also for the society as a whole.
The main regulatory implication raising from this pic-
ture is that the real challenge for labour regulation is to
find a design to address the use of temporary employment
as a flexible way to enter in the market allowing firms to
screen new workers towards more stable form of jobs, in-
stead of as a structural cheaper form of work. Probably, only
in those conditions labour market outcomes could be able
to benefit from all the advantages in terms of flexibility in-
duced by TE, without suffering the secondary consequences
on labour productivity. Hence, the future agenda of labour
market research should certainly include the identification
of such kind of regulation.
As discussed in the paper, the potential limitation of our
analysis is that, indeed, the employed measure of TE does
not allow us to distinguish between fixed-term contracts and
temporary agency workers, which instead might be relevant
as the two types of TE might (and often are found to) have
different effects in the user firm’s productivity. Under this
perspective, disentangling the differential effect of these
two types of TE would represent the next step on our un-
derstanding of the productivity effect of TE and, thus, a bit
of caution in the interpretation of our results is needed. Due
to data limitation, however, this is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Data description
The majority of variables employed in the paper (e. g.,
labour productivity, share of TE, EPL index for PE and
TE) are drawn from Lisi (2013), please refer to Lisi (2013)
for a full description of the dataset and the source of vari-
ables. Hereunder, we provide the description only of the
new variables in our empirical analysis.
Total Factor Productivity
Definition. Total factor productivity (base 1995 = 100)
(variable TFPva_I).
Source. EU KLEMS database.
Capital Stock
Definition. Gross capital stock in volume terms (variable
CPGK).
Source. OECD STAN database.
Share of skilled workers in SSII
Definition. Share of workers with a tertiary education
(level 5–6 ISCED 1997).
Source. EUROSTAT Science, technology and innovation
database.
Share of skilled workers in SSII2
Definition. Share of workers occupied in science and
technology tasks (HRST).
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Source. EUROSTAT Science, technology and innovation
database.
Product Market Regulation
Definition. OECD Indicators of Product Market Regula-
tion, a comprehensive set of indicators measuring the degree
to which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of
the product market where competition is viable. The indi-
cators cover formal regulations in the following areas: state
control of business enterprises; legal and administrative bar-
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics
Table B.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Labour Productivity 2080 110.936 24.237 63.486 286.575
Labour Productivity Growth 1950 0.018 0.051 –0.322 0.288
Total Factor Productivity 1920 103.742 15.522 61.629 199.388
Total Factor Productivity Growth 1800 0.006 0.047 –0.312 0.350
Capital-Labour ratio 1600 754,330.1 2,222,605 11,961.45 23,719,022
Capital-Labour ratio growth 1500 0.015 0.030 –0.102 0.241
Job Reallocation 1950 0.027 0.026 0.000 0.239
Frictionless Job Reallocation 2080 0.043 0.009 0.028 0.059
Share of TE 2080 0.118 0.103 0.000 0.694
EPL for Regular Contracts 2080 2.376 0.826 0.948 4.333
EPL for Temporary Contracts 2080 2.189 1.255 0.250 5.375
Trade Union Density 2080 0.402 0.229 0.076 0.839
Product Market Regulation 2080 1.696 0.481 0.771 2.528
Table B.2 Industry descriptive statistics
Industry TEj LPj TFPj FJRj
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 0.2048 117.1452 113.3016 0.049
Total Manufacturing 0.0891 119.5393 107.4631 0.038
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.0631 126.7167 110.3447 0.059
Construction 0.1400 100.1263 97.8735 0.045
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.1046 110.8905 104.1041 0.028
Hotels and Resturants 0.1761 100.0441 97.1390 0.040
Transport, Storage and Communication 0.0827 117.4543 108.4009 0.036
Financial Intermediation 0.0633 120.8515 106.3441 0.039
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 0.0932 96.2325 97.1183 0.057
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 0.1679 100.3553 95.3268 0.040
j – TE LP TFP –
TE 1 –0.4836 –0.2481 –
LP –0.4836 1 0.9130
TFP –0.2481 0.9130 1
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Table B.3 Country descriptive statistics
Country TEi LPi TFPi
Austria 0.0631 109.6844 106.0690
Belgium 0.0545 108.1211 101.0587
Denmark 0.0936 105.5621 98.1947
Finland 0.1289 112.1675 108.3581
France 0.1245 112.1939 106.8663
Germany 0.1164 110.7430 107.3981
Ireland 0.0626 119.8140 106.7250
Italy 0.1079 102.9484 98.2979
Netherlands 0.1374 111.0894 103.6141
Portugal 0.1624 116.6231 103.7416
Spain 0.3241 105.3882 98.8157
Sweden 0.1061 112.1912 104.4574
United Kingdom 0.0588 115.6359 105.0443
i – TE LP TFP
TE 1 –0.2972 –0.3224
LP –0.2972 1 0.7256
TFP –0.3224 0.7256 1
Table B.4 Temporary agency workers (TAW)
Country Share of TAW over total employmenta Share of TAW over total TE
1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007
Austria 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.064 0.108 0.170
Belgium 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.206 0.211 0.256
Denmark 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.018 0.045 0.089
Finland 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.023 0.029 0.069
France 0.016 0.024 0.025 0.133 0.170 0.166
Germany 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.042 0.058 0.109
Ireland 0.003 0.014 0.017 0.032 0.286 0.200
Italy n.l.r. 0.004 0.010 n.l.r. 0.040 0.076
Netherlands 0.023 0.021 0.028 0.204 0.148 0.156
Portugal 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.048 0.041 0.040
Spain 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.021 0.022 0.025
Sweden 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.034 0.059 0.076
United Kingdom 0.029 0.038 0.048 0.397 0.633 0.842
n.l.r. not legally recognised
aSource: CIETT (2009)
Table B.5 Skilled and unskilled sectors produced by “SSII”
Skilled sectors Unskilled sectors
Manufacturing Agriculture, hunting and forestry
Wholesale and retail trade Electricity, gas and water supply
Hotels and restaurants Construction
Financial intermediation Transport, storage and communication
Real estate, renting and business activities Other community, social and personal services
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Table B.6 Skilled and unskilled sectors produced by “SSII2”
Skilled sectors Unskilled sectors
Manufacturing Agriculture, hunting and forestry
Wholesale and retail trade Electricity, gas and water supply
Financial intermediation Construction
Real estate, renting and business activities Hotels and restaurants
Other community, social and personal services Transport, storage and communication
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